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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KEVIN CHUKES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020376-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In reply to the State's arguments, Appellant Kevin Chukes makes three assertions. 
First, Mr. Chukes asserts that the State's request to forego oral arguments is inappropriate 
under Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under that Rule, oral arguments 
are allowed unless this Court determines that the appeal is frivolous, the issue has already 
been authoritatively decided, or the briefing is inadequate and argument would not be 
helpful. Utah R. App. P. 29 (2002). But the State has alleged none of those things here. 
Second, the State is incorrect in arguing that someone who authoritatively 
represents another may commit theft-by-deception. This argument is baseless. If an 
appropriately authorized person represents another individual, corporation, or government 
body, the representation is binding. So, no theft or deception is committed. Some 
common examples of this include agency, power of attorney, and trusteeship. None of 
these circumstances constitute theft-by-deception. 
Third, contrary to the State's argument, forgery is not differentiated from identity 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fraud on the basis that forgery requires signing a name. Forgery may be committed in a 
number of ways that do not involve signing another's name to a document. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999). And, all of these ways, plus signing a name, are covered by the 
action element of identity fraud, which applies to any use of another's personal 
information. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002). So, forgery is a lesser-included 
offense of identity fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ORAL ARGUMENTS ARE APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
Oral arguments should be presented in this case because this case involves 
questions of law that have not been decided in Utah. Those questions are whether forgery 
is a lesser-included offense of identity fraud and whether both forgery and identity fraud 
are lesser-included offenses of theft-by-deception. Aplt. Br. 1-2. Neither question has 
been authoritatively decided, and the decisions are important because they will affect the 
way defendants are charged with these types of crimes. So, oral argument is appropriate. 
Under Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, oral argument should be 
allowed in every case unless this Court concludes that: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively 
decided; or 
(3) The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and 
record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
• ' 2 ' * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
argument. 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a) (2002); Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89, HI7, 16 P.3d 540. 
None of these circumstances occur here. This appeal is not frivolous because it is 
soundly based upon the lesser-included statute. Aplt. Br. 7-10. Also, there is persuasive 
authority supporting Mr. Chukes' arguments that greater-lesser relationships occur 
between the forgery and identity fraud statute, and the forgery, identity fraud, and theft-
by-deception statutes. Aplt. Br. 11-38. Further, the issues in this case have not been 
authoritatively decided in Utah. Finally, the briefing is thorough and includes an adequate 
outline of facts and the issue on appeal. Aplt. Br. 4-6, 7-38; Appellee's Br. 3-5, 6-20. All 
in all, oral argument is appropriate in this case to help with the organization and meaning 
of the different elements of the statutes and determine whether there is a greater-lesser 
relationship among them. 
II. THE LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT ANOTHER IS 
INHERENT IN THEFT BY DECEPTION 
The State fails in its attempt to differentiate forgery and identity fraud from theft-
by-deception. This is because its argument is based on the erroneous assertion that theft-
by-deception may be committed by someone who authoritatively acts on behalf of 
another, whereas forgery and identity fraud is committed only by someone who lacks 
authority. Appellee's Br. 14-15,18,20. However, theft-by-deception, like forgery and 
identity fraud, requires a lack of authority. This is apparent from the plain language of the 
3 
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theft-by-deception statute, Utah laws which specifically authorize individuals to act for 
others in certain circumstances, and persuasive case law from other states. 
First of all, the plain language of the theft-by-deception statute shows that theft-by-
deception is committed only when a person deceives another in obtaining the property of 
another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1999). And deception, in all of its statutory 
meanings, contemplates that an actor lacks the authority to make the representations 
which cause the victim to give up goods or services. "Deception" means that a person: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be 
true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or . . . 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the 
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed. 
R. 81-82; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1999). 
None of these definitions allow for the conviction of someone who authoritatively 
uses another's name or information. For instance, under the first definition, if a properly 
authorized person represents himself as having the ability to obtain credit or purchase 
4 
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items on behalf of the other, the representation is not false. Likewise, the representative's 
failure to correct this impression is not deception under the second definition. Under the 
third definition, a person representing another may or may not chose to disclose the 
personal information of the other, but either way it is not deception. Of course, someone 
with goods or services to sell may wish to have this disclosure, but the representative's 
failure to disclose does not, alone, amount to theft by deception. This is because the seller 
may well get what he bargained for. If so, no theft or statutory deception occurs.1 Finally, 
under the last definition, if an authorized representative is acting on behalf of another, he 
intends his promises to be binding, and so it is not deception under the fourth definition. 
All of this is easier to see in the context of some of the common forms of 
representation. One of these is company agency. An employee may be authorized to 
purchase items for a company, enter contracts for a company, or sell the company's 
goods.2 None of this amounts to theft by deception even though the employee is not 
actually the company or even an officer. Also, it is perfectly legal when a person with 
power-of-attomey uses the principal's money to purchase items on behalf of the 
principal.3 A custodian may enter a contract on behalf of a beneficiary, using the 
1
 Theft does not occur when there is "only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary 
significance . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(2) (1999); State v. Forshee. 588 P.2d 181, 183 
(Utah 1978). 
2
 Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Short. 1999 UT 73, U21, 985 P.2d 899; Foreign Study 
League v. Holland-America Line. 497 P.2d 244,246 (Utah 1972); Davis v. Pavne & Day. Inc.. 
348 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1960). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-501(4) (Supp. 2002). 
5 
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beneficiary's funds as security.4 And, a trustee may use trust funds to purchase items on 
behalf of a beneficiary. Utah Code Ann. 75-7-402 (2000). These are only some of the 
well-recognized forms of representation that do not amount to theft-by-deception. 
This shows that the State's argument that theft-by-deception may be committed 
when a properly-authorized individual acts on behalf of another individual, trust, business 
or government entity is implausible. A representative does no more than represent; it is 
the represented which is the responsible party, and so is the represented's information 
which is important. If this information is given, it is unimportant whether it is the 
represented or the representative which acted. 
Further, it would be unfair to subject properly-authorized individuals to the 
possibility of a conviction for theft-by-deception because of some transaction with a third 
party. Often, authorized individuals make purchases or even enter contracts without 
mentioning the fact that they are representing another individual or entity. And, there is 
no sound policy which would be forwarded by requiring these representatives to go 
through a time-consuming and often unnecessary disclosure procedure for every purchase 
or contract they make.5 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 75-5a-l 14(1) (1993) ("A custodian, acting in a custodial 
capacity, has all the rights, powers, and authority over custodial property that unmarried adult 
owners have over their own property, but a custodian may exercise those rights, powers, and 
authority in that capacity only."); Utah Code Ann. § 75-5a-l 17 (2003) 
5
 Of course, if the representative has inappropriately used funds with which he was 
entrusted, or otherwise hurt the interests of the represented, the represented usually has a cause 
of action against the representative. See, e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 75-5a-l 13 (2003) (care of 
custodial property); State v. Tavlon 378 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1963) (duty of employee to 
6 
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Persuasive case law from other jurisdictions clarifies this. In other states, the 
importance of a lack of authorization has been highlighted in cases where a defendant 
alleges he had authorization to use another's credit cards or write checks on another's 
account. In fact, the Supreme Court of North Dakota recently clarified that a defendant's 
contention that he had authority to write checks as a draw on future profits from his 
company raised a factual question of guilt. North Dakota v. Perreault 638 N.W.2d 541, 
544 (N.D. 2002). Likewise, in Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros.. Inc., the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court considered, among other issues, whether the defendant had authorization 
to use another individual's credit card in making purchases from a department store. 
Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros.. Inc.. 660 A.2d 83, 88-89 (Penn. 1995). Unauthorized 
purchases made on behalf of a municipality was the focus of a case decided by the 
Supreme Court of Kansas. State v. Schultz. 850 P.2d 818, 821 (Kan. 1993). And, in Ohio, 
a recent case clarified that a statutory lack of authorization for the distribution 
charitable funds was at the root of a theft case. State v. Black on Black Crime. Inc.. 736 
N.E.2d 962, 967 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). 
In sum, the State's argument that a lack of authorization is not part of the theft-by-
deception statute fails. Theft-by-deception contemplates that a person representing 
himself as another did not have permission to do so, and so the crimes of forgery and 
company). Also, other criminal statutes may apply. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-410 (1999) (theft by 
person having custody of property pursuant to repair or rental agreement); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-506.3 (1999) (unlawful acquisition, possession, or transfer of credit card); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-513 (1999) (unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary). So, that contingency does not 
concern us here. 
7 
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identity fraud cannot be differentiated on this basis. 
III. FORGERY MAY BE COMMITTED WITHOUT SIGNING A NAME 
The State's argument that forgery is not a lesser-included offense of identity fraud 
is incorrect. This is because the State bases this argument on the erroneous assertion that, 
at least in this case, forgery requires the signing of a name. Appellee's Br. 13. However, 
forgery may be committed in many ways. And, these ways essentially amount to any use 
of another's personal information, as prohibited by the identity fraud statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002). This is apparent from the forgery statute itself. 
The forgery statute prohibits not only the signing of a name, but also altering 
another's writing without permission or uttering such a writing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
501(l)(a) (1999). Also, making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing, 
transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing so that it appears to be that of another is 
prohibited. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1 )(b) (1999). What is more, the forgery statute 
emphasizes that "writing" includes "printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) 
(1999). These definitions are broad and take into account numerous actions, not just 
signing a name. 
So, the State's contention that a name must be signed before forgery is committed 
is incorrect, and the forgery and identity fraud statutes cannot be differentiated on this 
basis. 
8 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Chukes respectfully requests that this court vacate his 
convictions for forgery and identity fraud. Alternatively, Mr. Chukes requests that this 
Court vacate his conviction for forgery. 
• - - * V \ 
SUBMITTED this O day of February, 2003. 
V y C/HEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
9 
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